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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the problems of ecotourism and proposes some suggestions according to the behaviors of travel 
agency, tourist and eco-scenic spot. From a macro perspective, the government should tax the eco-scenic spots in 
order to solve the externalities of ecotourism. Establishing the return model between the travel agency and eco-scenic 
spot is useful to restrict travel agency behavior. This paper constructs the ecotourism models based on capital and tax 
aiming at harmonious development and proposes a series of recommendations for the government and eco-scenic 
spots. 
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1. Introduction 
Ecotouris m is the sustainable development touris m which is developed on the ecotourism resources 
(such as ecological landscape, ecological environment, ecological culture, ecological technology, 
ecological industry, ecological products, etc.) for content , and based on ecological civilization. With the 
development of ecotourism in China, some issues are gradually exposed such as the tourism 
environmental damage worse than before, over-supply of tourism enterprises  and low quality of tourists. 
On the one hand, the objective of scenic spots is  economic interests that ignore environmental capacity of 
ecotourism to expand the supply of eco-products resulting in the destruction of ecotourism environment. 
On the other hand, the travel agencies attract tourists blindly leading to excessive tourists in eco-scenic 
spots and vandalism increasing. This paper draws some economic  theories and emphasizes to establish 
the management among the government and major companies of ecotouris m. By  the government revenue 
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model and financial return model between scenic spots and travel agencies , we can  achieve the 
interlocking and benefit-sharing ecotourism management in a certain sense.  
2. Theoretical background 
At present most of the ecotourism researches are based on the qualitative view. Hu Pan (2006) pointed 
out that ecotourism in  the external problems  should be solved through tax measures, educational tools, 
administrative tools, and information management of the scenic spots. Liu Yan (2009) stressed that 
ecotourism should emphasize the enjoyment of nature and conservation of nature, and the fuzzy core 
theory of ecotourism is one important reason to causes the proliferation of ecotourism development. Guo 
Meijian (2007) believed that the information asymmetry caus ing adverse selection of ecotourism leads to 
market  failure, and the relationship between government and  ecotourism enterprises may lead to moral 
hazard. She proposed that social control should be used to restrain the adverse selection and the internal 
problems caused by moral hazard can be restrained by economic regulation. Some scholars quote the 
green supply chain theory to research the ecotourism management. Dai Baoping (2002) analyzed the 
necessity and feasibility of tourism supply chain management implementation, and proposed to construct 
the tourism supply chain through enterprise information integration, resource sharing and the 
establishment of strategic alliances . Zhang Shuhai (2007) believed that green supply chain and 
ecotourism have better consistency so that the resource development should be based on the principles of 
green supply chain in the process of ecotourism development. 
Most of the current researches focus on how to govern the eco-scenic spots, and we believe independent 
ecotourism management just from the single touris m enterprises is difficu lt to achieve the sustainable 
development of ecotourism. We suggest that ecotourism management is not a single enterprise or 
government responsibilities, but should be the harmony and unity management of tourism enterprises. 
3. Theoretical background 
According to the economic hypothesis , the rational economic man or enterprise will change the 
orientation of its behavior through capital or tax. Rat ional economic man  would  change economic 
activities in accordance with objective that aims at maximizing the personal utility or business interests . 
This paper is based on the government revenue model by affecting the supply and demand of ecotourism 
products to protect ecotourism environment from the damage activ ities. Learn ing from game theory and 
revenue sharing contract of green supply chain, this paper construct a suitable ecotourism revenue model 
of cooperation according to the game matrix between travel agencies and scenic spots. By analyzing the 
revenue model, we get some useful suggestions on how to prevent the environmental damages caused by 
travel agencies.  
4. The economic models of ecotourism management 
In this paper, the ecotouris m management includes two economic models which are revenue model 
and return model. The revenue model can be used to solve the external p roblem of scenic spot and the 
return model can p lay the important ro le in coordination among the tourism enterprises based on the 
economic benefits .  
4.1 The Revenue model between government and scenic spots 
As semi- public goods, the ownership of ecological touris m resource is vested in country so that the 
government has the higher execution strength and ability than any of the touris m enterprises to solve the 
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external problem of ecotourism. 
For ecotourism products  external problem, we assume that scenic spot A is the production enterprise. As 
the figure showing, MSC is the marginal social cost, MPC is the marginal costs of ecological product, and 
D is touris m market demand. Q1 is ecotouris m products supply when MPC is equal to D and Q  is the 
optimal supply as MSC is equal to D. According to A’s private cost of production, the products supply Q1 
is greater than Qand P1 is lower than optimum price P . This shows that the scenic spots supply excessive 
products in accordance with their private cost and the price is lower than P . 
Figure 1 external problem of ecotourism
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In the microeconomic the government can use the following two ways to control the external problems, 
one of which is using policies directly to control actions or providing efficient incentives to private 
manufacturer based on market. Another way is Pigovian tax. Specifically, the government can levy on 
producers, establish the supply standards or transfer the licenses for external governance. For scenic spot 
which has a fixed proportion cost of production, the government can levy taxes on its products to 
stimulate the supply. 
The goal of government tax is to decrease balance supply of tourism products from Q1 to Q*. T means 
the tax which is levied by government for per unit of product, S is the area's tourism product supply and 
D is the demand of tourists . Q  is the optimal supply under the T. As be shown in  the fig, the decrease of 
supply is ΔQ=Q1–Q  and the tax is A+B= tQ . 
And we can get the equations as following, 
Qd = Q d(Pd)                                                      ˄1˅  
Qs = Qs(Ps)                                                       ˄2˅ 
Qs = Qd = Q                                                        (3˅ 
Pd – Ps = t                                                          ˄4˅ 
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Figure 2 taxing on scenic spot
 
The government revenue comes from consumers and touris m enterprises which  has stimulating effect 
to reduce the consumption and production trends . Form (3), we know the supply and demand are still on 
the balance under the government tax and Q* is the same as supply when MSC = D. Through taxes the 
government reduces the supply of ecotourism products and the externalities of eco-scenic resources. On 
the other hand, government gets the taxes which can be used as compensation fund for environmental 
management and maintenance of tourism resources . We believe the benign cycle model of "tax - 
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compensation" can control the touris m product supply to prevent the excess supply or demand of tourism 
products which may be a better solution to the tourism externality problem. 
4.2 The Return model between scenic spot and travel agency 
Currently, the cooperative approach generally  used is that the travel agencies directly  pay tickets to 
scenic spots so that the trading relat ionship between them is finished before tourists consume the tourism 
products. By this way, it’s prone for travel agencies to indulge tourists making the destructive 
consumption of ecotourism after they purchase tourism products. Based on this, we set up a return model 
between the eco-scenic spots and travel agencies in order to promote travel agencies to guide the eco-
tourist activities initiatively. 
The model assumes that scenic spots and travel agencies are all risk neutral that all have profit-driven 
behavior and the penalty cost of scenic spots  is 0. On the other hand, we assume that travel agencies can 
buy the cheaper team tickets in large quantities. 
The cost of travel agencies guide tourists to consume high-level ecotourism activit ies is C1, and on the 
contrary it is C2 which means C1> C2. The probability for travel agencies to guide tourists to consume 
high-level ecotourism activit ies is D and otherwise it is 1–D. The probability for travel agencies to be 
fined by scenic spots is E, and probability of no-penalty is 1–E. The profits obtained by travel agencies is 
W per person. The ratio o f penalty is )  of the total profits and the number of tourists  is Q. Travel 
agencies will earn R1 if they guide the tourists at C1 or earn R2 at C2. 
As the table showing, 
R1=(W-C1)Q                                                                                                                                            (5) 
R2= E[(W–C2)Q–)WQ] + (1–E)(W–C2 )Q                                                                                            (6) 
The Model is following: expected return of travel agencies guide the tourist in random is E. 
E= (1–D) {E[ (W–C2)Q–)WQ] + (1–E)(W–C2 )Q}+D(W–C1)Q                                                           (7) 
When R1 tE, travel agencies will guide tourists to consume the product in the high-level. 
(W–C1)Qt  (1–D){E[(W–C2)Q–)WQ]+(1–E)(W–C2)Q}+D(W–C1)Q                                                  (8) 
From (8), we can get that   ) t  W
CC
E
21 
                                                                                            (9) 
And now we should check ) is the condition that bounds travel behavior or not. In the premise of )ˈ
the travel agencies will guide tourists in high levels of ecotourism activities only when R1t  R2  
(W–C1)Q t  E[ (W–C2)Q–)WQ] + (1–E)(W–C2 )Q                                                                           (10) 
)t  W
CC
E
21 
                                                                                                                                      (11) 
The result of (11)is same with (9). According to (6) and (10), we suggest that scenic spots should 
charge travel agencies an addit ional ) at  the beginning of transactions as the constraints funds which can 
promote travel agencies to guide the tourist in the high-level. Above all, we can get the results as 
following, 
z There is a positive relationship between )and C1–C2. The gap between C1and C2 is bigger, and )  
should be bigger. Scenic spots should increase or reduce ) according to the gap in order to induce travel 
agencies and tourists behaviors. 
z There is a negative relationship between )and E.Scenic spots can reduce the ) when E is bigger and 
vice versa. Scenic spot can set the ) smaller than normal when E is big enough.   
z There is a negative relationship between )and W. Scenic spots can reduce the ) when profits W is 
satisfactory for travel agencies and vice versa. 
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Table1.Income matrix of scenic spot and travel agency
 
Return model is an income contract between scenic spot and travel agency, which means scenic spots 
have the responsibility to promote and supervise travel agencies aiming at the sustainable development of 
ecotourism. According to C1and C2, scenic spots can make a contract which allows them to charge an 
additional ) of the total profits and return ) to travel agencies based on the behaviors of tourists and 
travel agencies. The significance of ) is travel agencies will get E which is smaller than R1 when they 
guide tourists to protect the eco-environment at  C2.In order to obtain the maximum benefit, travel 
agencies should guide tourists at C1 so that they can get the ) from scenic spots.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the ecotourism management among government and tourism enterprises. The 
revenue model shows tax can not only ease ecotourism pressure between supply and demand but also 
help eco-scenic spots to obtain funds of ecological compensation. The return model is the new contract 
which can regulate the non-ecological behaviors of travel agency and tourist. We believe the external 
problem and non-ecological behaviors of tourism enterprises and tourists can be managed to some extent 
based on the two economic models. 
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